Arthur Seyss-Inquart

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: I was born in 1892 in Iglau, situated in what was up to now a German-speaking enclave in Moravia. Moravia, at that time, was a crown province of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There and in the German-speaking enclave Olmutz, also in Moravia, I lived until the age of 15, when with my parents I moved into the vicinity of Vienna where I completed my studies at the Gymnasium and the legal faculty of the University of Vienna.

Note: The source for all items, unless otherwise noted, is the evidence presented to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at the first Nuremberg Trial, between November 21, 1945 and October 1, 1946. As always, these excerpts from trial testimony should not necessarily be mistaken for fact. It should be kept in mind that they are the sometimes-desperate statements of hard-pressed defendants seeking to avoid culpability and shift responsibility from charges that, should they be found guilty, can possibly be punishable by death.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: When the agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached—without my having taken any part in it—Dr. Schuschnigg through Minister Klees asked me for my political co-operation. At that time I had particularly close connections with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the Fatherland Front. At the suggestion of Zernatto and his friends I became an Austrian State Councilor and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in writing, of examining the conditions under which the national opposition could be enlisted to collaborate politically. In order to fulfill that task I did, of course, have to contact the National Socialists, because the national opposition consisted only of National Socialists.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: The agreement at Berchtesgaden on 12 February contained a definite stipulation to the effect that I was to be liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists on one side, and the German Reich on the other. The contents of the protocol appeared to me unsatisfactory and even dangerous. There was no doubt at all that my appointment to the Ministry of the Interior and Security served as a notification, if not a signal, for the Austrian National Socialists that they might expect an early realization of their political objectives. In addition they received permission to profess their beliefs; they could wear the swastika and salute with the raised hand. What was not permitted, however, was their organization; that means, my National Socialist friends in Austria had no possibility of getting in touch with the National Socialists in a legal way. This agreement opened the gates without providing for a regular procedure thereafter.

From Seyss-Inquart's shorthand notes on the meeting: A condition of Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg is that I adhere to an autonomous and independent Austria, that I support the Constitution, that is, further development, including the Anschluss, must be based on this. The formation of public opinion in Austria must proceed independently and in accordance with present constitutional possibilities. I must be an active guarantor for Dr. Schuschnigg of the revolutionary way, in the meaning of these statements (Yes), no Trojan horse. The Party and Movement must not adopt a militant attitude against prevailing cultural conceptions. (Yes). No totalitarianism of the Party and Movement; that is, National Socialist ideology to be realized with due appreciation and regard for conditions in Austria; not to be imposed on others by force. The Party as such is not simply to disappear, but to exist as an organization of individuals; no illegal activity, no efforts inimical to the State, everything to be done in a legal fashion, anyone failing to do this, to be locked up.

From 'The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich' by William Shirer: Seyss-Inquart, the first of the quislings, was a pleasant-mannered, intelligent young Viennese lawyer who since 1918 had been possessed with a burning desire to see Austria joined with Germany. This was a popular notion in the first years after the war...The victorious Allies had not allowed it and by the time Hitler took power in 1933 there is no doubt that the majority of Austrians were against their little country's joining with Nazi Germany. But to Seyss-Inquart, as he said at his trial in Nuremberg, the Nazis stood unflinchingly for the Anschluss and for this reason he gave them his support. He did not join the party and too no part in its rowdy excesses. He played the role, rather, of a respectable front for the Austrian Nazis, and after the July 1936 agreement, when he was elected State Councilor, he concentrated his efforts, aided by Papen and other German officials and agents, in burrowing from within.

Strangely, both Schuschnigg and Miklas seem to have trusted him almost to the end. Later Miklas, a devout Catholic as was Schuschnigg, confessed that he was favorably impressed by the fact that Seyss was a diligent churchgoer. The mans Catholicism and also the circumstance that he, like Schuschnigg, had served in a Tyrolean Kaiserjäger regiment during the First World War, in which he was severely wounded, seems to have been the basis of the trust which the Austrian Chancellor had for him. Schuschnigg, unfortunately, had a fatal inability to judge a man on more substantial grounds. Perhaps he thought he could keep his new Nazi Minister in line by simple bribes. He himself tells in his book of the magic effect of $500 on Seyss-Inquart a year before when he threatened to resign as State Councilor and then reconsidered on the receipt of this paltry sum. But Hitler had bigger prizes to dazzle before the ambitious young lawyer, as Schuschnigg was soon to learn.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: The day before Dr. Schuschnigg announced in Innsbruck the plan for the plebiscite he called me in and informed me of his plan. I asked him at that time whether the decision was unalterable, and he affirmed that. I expressed my concern that this might lead to difficulties; but I promised him that I would help him wherever I could, either to make the best of this plebiscite or to bring about a suitable outcome - suitable, that is to say, even for the National Socialists.

Of course, I had continual contact with the Austrian National Socialists, since I was the liaison man...on the same evening I was also approached by Dr. Jury who in some way had already heard of the plan for the plebiscite. I did not tell him that I had given my assent to Dr. Schuschnigg, though on account of my function as liaison man as laid down in the agreement of 12 February, I should not have allowed silence to be imposed on me; yet, I did keep silent.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: We agreed that the Government—as well as the provincial governments, and so forth—should include National Socialists, that, in effect, a coalition government should be formed; and in that case the National Socialists would also vote 'yes.' Only with reference to the license of the Party, the activities of the Party, were there still differences of opinion. I reported this to the Austrian National Socialists but they were not much interested, because news had come from Berlin that Hitler had rejected the plebiscite. I was told that on the next day I would receive a letter from Hitler...After receiving this letter I went with Minister Glaise to Dr. Schuschnigg. We were at the Federal Chancellor's office at 10 o'clock, and I informed Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg of the entire contents of this letter without reservation.

In particular, I pointed out that in case of a refusal Adolf Hitler expected unrest among the Austrian National Socialists and that he was ready, if disturbances occurred, to answer an appeal for help by marching in. In other words, I expressly called Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg's attention to the possibility of this development...The letter set a deadline, 12 o'clock. As our talk lasted until about 11:30, I asked Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg to give me an answer by 2 o'clock. I know that in the meantime, and also on the previous day, he had taken security measures through Dr. Skubl, of which I had approved. A number of age groups of the Austrian Federal Army were called up, the police everywhere received instructions, and a curfew was imposed in the evening.

Adolf Hitler, from Mein Kamp: German Austria must be restored to the great German motherland; and not, indeed, on any grounds of economic calculation whatsoever. No, no. Even if the union were a matter of economic indifference, and even if it were to be disadvantageous from the economic standpoint, still it ought to take place. People of the same blood should be in the same Reich. The German people will have no right to engage in a colonial policy until they shall have brought all their children together in one state. When the territory of the Reich embraces all the Germans and finds itself unable to assure them a livelihood, only then can the moral right arise from the need of the people, to acquire foreign territory. The plough is then the sword; and the tears of war will produce the daily bread for the generations to come...

To demand that the 1914 frontiers should be restored is a glaring political absurdity that is fraught with . such consequences as to make the claim itself appear criminal. The confines of the Reich as they existed in 1914 were thoroughly illogical because they were not really complete, in the sense of including all the members of the German nation. Nor were they reasonable, in view of the geographical exigencies of military defense. They were not the consequences of a political plan which had been well considered and carried out, but they were temporary frontiers established in virtue of a political struggle that had not been brought to a finish; and indeed, they were partly the chance result of circumstances.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: During a conference with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at 3:30 in the afternoon, the Chancellor said that he would hand to the Federal President the resignation of the whole Cabinet. When I was informed of this, I left the Federal Chancellor's office, because I considered my function as a middleman concluded in the meaning of the agreement of 12 February; and I did not want in any way to advocate or promote my own appointment as Federal Chancellor...until 8 o'clock in the evening no one at all approached me on these matters. No one spoke to me about the Federal Chancellorship; no other possibility of a solution was discussed with me. I heard that the Federal President wanted to make Dr. Ender, of Vorarlberg, Chancellor and me Vice Chancellor. I believe that suggestion would have been completely practicable. But I could not discuss it—least of all with Berlin—because no one had said anything to me about it.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: "In the course of the evening it became clear that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg would resign and that the Reich would not tolerate any other than a National Socialist Government. Therefore, in order to avoid being taken by surprise, I considered it my task to study whom I should take into a Cabinet. The suggestions mentioned in the telephone conversations were not transmitted by me at all. I chose my colleagues quite independently—naturally after consultations with Austrian National Socialists—and they included also people with strong Catholic ties, such as Professor Mengin, Dr. Wolf, and others. I asked Foreign Minister Schmidt to enter the Cabinet. He asked me for a reason, and I told him: I want to keep Austria autonomous and independent, and I need a foreign minister who has connections with the Western Powers. Schmidt refused, remarking that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had introduced him into politics and that he would remain loyal to him...

The resignation of the whole Cabinet was not accepted by the Federal President; and we, including myself, remained Ministers. When Dr. Schuschnigg made his farewell speech, he did not speak of the resignation of the whole Cabinet. He only said, "We yield to force." Dr. Schuschnigg and Federal President Miklas had agreed at that time that I would not actually be appointed Federal Chancellor, but that with the entry of German troops executive power should be passed to me. Therefore, in my opinion, I was de facto Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister...

I did not see Federal President Miklas at all until 9 or 10 o'clock in the evening, after Schuschnigg's speech...I believe it was after Schuschnigg's farewell speech, when I saw in the anterooms 10 or 15 young men in black trousers and white shirts, that was the SS. I had the impression that they were doing messenger and orderly duty for State Secretary Keppler and the others. As they approached the rooms in which Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg and President Miklas were, I ordered guards of the Austrian Guard Battalion to be placed at their doors.

I may mention that these were selected men of the Austrian Army who according to Austrian standards were very well armed, while these SS men—40 at most—possibly carried pistols. Moreover, 50 steps from the Federal Chancellor's office were the barracks of the Guard Battalion, with a few hundred picked and well-armed anew. If Federal President Miklas and Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had not been concerned with things other than those which happened in the Federal Chancellor's office and on the street outside it, they could easily have put an end to this situation by calling out the Guard Battalion.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: One cannot call it an invasion; it was a stormy, loudly cheered entry of German troops. There were no villages—even those with an orthodox Catholic population—and no workers' districts which did not burst out in stormy jubilation. Moreover, both Dr. Schuschnigg and I were completely clear about this; once in 1937 he had agreed with me when I said that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be impeded by anything but the ovations of the population.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: I called the Führer in connection with the entry of troops...I did nothing which in any way furthered the taking over of control in Austria or to express it more correctly, which intentionally furthered the establishment of the National Socialists and the seizure of power. I only acted as an intermediary within the meaning of the Treaty of 12 February. But from the moment when the system of the Fatherland Front came to an end, I considered it my responsibility to take action.

First I made a radio speech, but not the one which had been prescribed for me in the morning. For I did not speak of a provisional government, but referred to myself as Minister of the Interior. Only then did I call on the SA and the SS to act as auxiliary police; and like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no resistance to the entry of German troops. Subsequently I was appointed Federal Chancellor, and my Cabinet was approved.

On the same night I drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid something might happen to him at the hands of provocateurs; and I asked Dr. Keppler to call up the Führer and ask him not to give the order for the entry of troops. Reich Marshal Göring spoke about that here. In the morning I called up again; then I met the Fuehrer at the airport in Linz, and, as the entry of the troops was in full progress, I asked him whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the German Reich, so that, symbolically at least, equal rights would be maintained. The Führer agreed; and Austrian troops actually marched into Munich, Berlin, and other cities, in Austrian uniform.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: I reported on the Anschluss Law to the Fuehrer; and I took the opportunity of discussing three questions with him immediately. That was, however, not at all easy, for the Fuehrer was deeply moved and wept. First, I asked that the Austrian Party might retain relative independence and be headed by an Austrian as the provincial leader; second, that Austria as a state might also enjoy a certain degree of independence. To the first request the Fuehrer said, "Possibly"; to the second he said, "Yes"; Austria would receive her own governor, a Reichsstatthalter. I then rose and asked the Fuehrer that I be allowed to return to my private practice as a lawyer. As a third request, I asked that the unjust exchange rate of 2 schillings to 1 mark be altered to 1.50. The Fuehrer agreed to that also.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: I was responsible for the civil administration, and, within this administrative task, I had to look after the interests of the Reich. Apart from this I had a political task. I was to see to it that while Dutch independence was maintained, the Netherlands should be persuaded to change their pro-British attitude for a pro-German one and enter into a close economic collaboration...An occupational power, I said, demands the suppression of all official activities and an awakening of a common political will, but grants such freedom which in the end may lead the Dutch to feel dependent on their own decisions. It was not my intention, therefore, to force upon the Dutch people any definite political will...

It is certainly correct that the goal which I had set for myself, and which I proclaimed in my speeches, was not reached in practice, nor could it have been. However, it may be possible that it gave the Dutch the impression that I was trying to force National Socialism upon them because, after all, later on I could admit only National Socialist parties, whereas I had to dissolve the others. I never used state methods of coercion to force any Dutchman to become a National Socialist, nor did I make membership in the National Socialist Party a condition for exercising the general rights and privileges to which every Dutchman was entitled.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: When I took over the functions of the Reich Commissioner, I of course realized that I had to take a definite attitude, and would have to take some steps with regard to the Jews in the Netherlands. Amsterdam, in western Europe, is perhaps one of the best known and one of the oldest seats of Jewish communities in western Europe. Moreover, in the Netherlands there were a great many German Jewish emigrants. I will say quite openly that since the first World War and the postwar period, I was an anti-Semite and went to Holland as such. I need not go into detail about that here. I have said that in my speeches, and would refer you to them.

I had the impression, which will be confirmed everywhere, that the Jews, of course, had to be against National Socialist Germany. There was no discussion of the question of guilt as far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied territory I had only to deal with the facts. I had to realize that, particularly from the Jewish circles, I had to reckon with resistance, defeatism, and so on. I told Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, that in the Netherlands I would remove Jews from leading posts in the economy, the press, and the administration. The measures taken by me from May 1940 to March 1941 were limited to that. The Jewish officials were dismissed, but were given pensions. The Jewish firms were registered, and the heads of the firms were dismissed. In the spring of 1941 Heydrich came to me in the Netherlands. He told me that we would have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish circles. He told me that the Jews would at least have to be treated like other enemy aliens.

The English, for instance, in the Netherlands, were interned and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of Jews—about 140,000—this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did not object to this argument of Heydrich's. I also felt that this was necessary in a war which I absolutely considered a life and death struggle for the German people. For that reason, in March 1941 I ordered that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. And then things went on step by step.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: That was a police transit camp-that is, for police prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts, or who were to be sent to the Reich; or persons who refused labor service who were being sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than 6 or 8 weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp-not Dutch Police, but a voluntary SS guard company, I believe. Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been beaten to death there. I urged the Higher SS and Police Leader to bring this case to light. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to me. According to the documents, severe mistreatment occurred, but no one was killed, and the persons responsible were punished.

I repeatedly called the attention of the Higher SS and Police Leader to the fact that concentration camps and prisons in wartime actually favored the perpetration of brutal excesses. If, here or there, not a severe case but certain mistreatment was reported to me, I always called his attention to it. He then reported to me either that the case had not occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth. In particular, I always had the food ration statistics of the concentration camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were satisfactory. I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in the western Netherlands. Of course, I do not want to give too much importance to this fact-, because the Dutch did suffer from hunger.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: In the Vught Concentration Camp, soon after its opening, there was a high mortality rate. Immediately I had an investigation started, using the services of Dutch medical personnel. Every day—and later on every week—I had the mortality figures reported to me, until they sank to what was approximately a normal level. Of course, I do not know whether the director of the camp reported the normal death cases only, or whether he included the cases of shooting-I could not say. In this cams there were excesses due to drinking parties and reveling; brawls and fights were also heard now and then. The head of the camp was removed and sent to the Reich.

I noted that the Higher SS and Police Leader had apparently himself tried to maintain order, although he was not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenführer Pohl. There was one very serious case which, in Document Number F-224 D, is described under the title, "Women in Cell." The head of the camp—allegedly for disciplinary reasons—had a large number of women crowded into a cell overnight, whereby three or four women were smothered to death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central Administration in Berlin refused, and we turned to Reichsführer SS Himmler and did not give in. The head of the camp was put on trial and received at least 4 years—I believe even a sentence of 8 years.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: The Dutch Government had already set up Westerborg as a completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was enlarged into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were Jewish guards to maintain order. Dutch Police guarded the camp on the outside. There was only a detail of the Security Police for supervision in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the camp itself. Every Sunday clergymen went to the camp, at least one clergyman for the catholic Jews, and one for the so-called Christians. They, too, never reported anything.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: About 1942, I believe, Heydrich came along with further demands-this time that the Jews be evacuated. He explained this by saying that Holland would sooner or later be a theater of war, in which one could not allow such a hostile population to remain. He pointed out that he was responsible for the police security of the Reich, and that he could not bear this responsibility if the Jews remained in Holland. I believe that we in the Netherlands opposed this evacuation project for 3 or 4 months while attempting to find other ways out.

Finally, Heydrich had a Fuehrer decree sent to me, according to which he had unlimited powers to carry out all measures in the occupied territories as well. I inquired of Bormann what this meant, and this order was confirmed, whereupon the evacuation of the Jews was begun. At that time I tried to ascertain the fate of the Jews, and it is rather difficult for me to speak about it now because it sounds like mockery. I was told that the Jews were to be sent to Auschwitz. I had people sent from the Netherlands to Auschwitz. They came back with the report that that was a camp for 80,000 people with sufficient space. The people were comparatively well off there. For example, they had an orchestra of 100 men. A witness here, confirming that this orchestra played when victims arrived at Auschwitz, made me think of that report.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: I asked the Security Police, that is, Heydrich, whether it would not be possible for the evacuated Jews to keep up correspondence with the Netherlands. This concession was made. For about three quarters of a year or a year correspondence was maintained; not only short post cards but long letters were permitted. I do not know how the camp administration did this; but the letters were identified as authentic by the addressee. When the number of letters dropped off later-it never stopped completely-the Security Police told me that the Jews in Auschwitz now had fewer acquaintances in the Netherlands, meaning other Jews, because most of them were already in Auschwitz.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: The Higher SS Leader and I both objected to this order, as we clearly realized what damaging effects it would have, especially in the Netherlands. Through such an order the Dutch would only be driven into illegal organizations. During a period of 4 to 6 weeks the Higher SS and Police Leader never carried out the order. But he then received a severe reprimand from Himmler, and from that time on he was obliged to deal with the Dutch who had been arrested for sabotage or illegal activities, and had to judge them according to his own jurisdiction, shooting them when necessary. One can account in this way for the shootings on a larger scale, but I do not believe that there were as many as 4,000. As often as I could, I urged the Security Police to be most careful in carrying out this order, but I never received any reports on the individual cases. I had the impression that there were perhaps 600 to 700...

I fully approved of action being taken against members of the resistance movement who committed sabotage and other acts. There were no other means for taking steps except arrest by the Police, passing of judgment on the part of the Higher SS and Police Leader, and shooting on the part of the Police. I could not oppose these measures.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: The Jews were collected in the Westerbork Camp. When the first transports left, I received a report that the trains were overcrowded. I vigorously remonstrated with the commander of the Security Police and asked him to see that the transport was carried out in an orderly manner. The Netherlands Report states that at the beginning the transports were made under tolerable conditions; later, conditions generally became worse. But that such excessive overcrowding of trains occurred as indicated in the report did not come to my knowledge. It is true that the Security Police made it very difficult to have the execution of these measures controlled.

At the suggestion of some Dutch secretaries general, especially Van Damm and Froehlich, I effected an exception for a number of Jews. One could effect individual exceptions; the basic measures could not be changed. I believe that the number of exceptions is greater than indicated in the Netherlands Report, at least according to my reports. These Jews were, in the final stage, in the Westerbork Camp. When the invasion began Himmler wanted to remove them. Upon my objections this was not done. But after the battle of Arnhem he removed them, as he said, to Theresienstadt; and I hope that they remained alive there.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: Blastings were undertaken at the moment when the Netherlands again became a theater of war. As for port and dock installations and shipyards, the following is important: The port of Antwerp fell almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy. I believe that that was of decisive importance for the further development of the offensive. Thereupon the competent military authorities in the Netherlands began to blow up such installations as a precautionary measure. I am only acquainted with the fact, not with the details; and I refused to watch the explosions. But my commissioner and I intervened with the Armed Forces offices, and I believe that in Rotterdam half of the installations were not blown up. This is shown by the Dutch reports. I had nothing whatever to do with the matter, aside from this intervention. When the English reached Limburg, an order was issued to blow up the mines as being vital for war. I inquired with Reich Minister Speer about this, and he issued an order not to blow them up but only to put them out of commission for 3 or 4 months. The orders were issued to this effect. I hope that they were not violated.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: I received a 'scorched earth' order from Bormann. Without there being a military necessity for it, all technical installations were to be blown up. That meant, in effect, the destruction of Holland, that is, the western Netherlands. If explosions are carried out in 14 or 16 different places in Holland the country will be entirely flooded in 3 or 4 weeks. I did not carry out the order at first; instead I established contact with Reich Minister Speer. I had a personal meeting with him on 1 April in Oldenburg. Speer told me that the same order had been given in the Reich; but that he was frustrating it, that he now had full authority in this matter, and that he agreed that the order should not be carried out in the Netherlands. It was not carried out...

Up until that time I did not want to believe it; but faced with the prospect of an unconditional surrender and complete occupation, I naturally believed that in every respect I should have to prepare for the worst because the consequences were unpredictable. Speer at that time told me that the war, for Germany, would end in a relatively short period of time because armament production simply could not be kept up. He said 2 to 3 months...I decided to end the defensive occupation of Holland without violating my duties to the Reich and to the Fuehrer.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: I went to The Hague and discussed the methods with Secretary General Hirschfeld. We agreed to get in touch at once with the confidential agents of the Government in The Hague-which was illegal for me-and to ask them to start negotiations on the basis that the Allied troops should not advance against Holland, in which case no further destruction would occur and the Allies could take over the feeding of the Dutch population through direct contact with the Dutch authorities for food supply. Then we would wait for the end of the war.

From Seyss-Inquart's IMT testimony: I had the conversation with Lieutenant General Bedell Smith. I purposely did not ask for authorization from Berlin in order to avoid a refusal or be prohibited from carrying out my intention. I did this on my own. General Blaskowitz, the commander of the Netherlands, was very apprehensive. He called me during the night, because his superiors had asked him just what was going on. Nevertheless, I was determined to carry through this matter, for it seemed the only reasonable step I could take in this situation. I stated that I would assume all responsibility. On 30 April the conference took place and the result that I had desired in effect materialized-the giving up of the military defense of Holland.

From Justice at Nuremberg by Robert E. Conot: The tall, introverted Seyss-Inquart, who had led Austria into the Anschluss with Germany, limped badly as a result of a World War I wound that left one leg shorter than the other. A highly intelligent sophist and opportunist, his studious, slightly fish-eyed appearance was accentuated by his thick-lensed glasses...Limping to the witness stand, his eyes swimming like egg yolks behind his thick glasses, Seyss-Inquart presented the image of a colorless bureaucrat, neither evil nor immortal: a politically vapid, lukewarm Nazi who had not joined the party until two months after the Anschluss which he had brokered...Although Seyss-Inquart had been indicted for his role in the Anschluss as much as for his administration of Holland, it was his actions in the Netherlands on which he was going to be primarily judged.

From The Nuremberg Trial by Ann and John Tusa: In prison at Nuremberg, he (Seyss-Inquart) responded to those around him with a sensitivity which was rare among the defendants. He wrote to his wife about the prison workers who carried out menial tasks under the supervision of Andrus's guards: 'They are the real mourners. How have they reacted to the fact that only because of us they were not already long united with their families?' Other defendants hated the guards for their noisiness and brash behavior, forcing unwelcome conversation on the prisoners by leaning through the hatch in the door of the cell, cadging autographs.

Only Seyss-Inquart had any sympathy for them: 'They are young, very young...Is it any wonder that they are impatient and restless...After a short time nearly all of them have been friendly and open, as far as the rules allow.' But that kind of sympathetic understanding needs to be compared with Seyss-Inquart's offer in 1943 to Dutch Jews who had mixed marriages to choose between Auschwitz and sterilization. His testimony did not leave a good impression...The only defense Seyss-Inquart had been able to give was that his administration in Holland could have been worse. He might be satisfied to compare himself against Frank in Poland or Koch in the Ukraine; the Tribunal must measure him against the law.

From The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials by Telford Taylor: Seyss-Inquart's counsel, Dr Steinbauer, was well aware that his client had left the witness stand shouldering a substantial burden of admitted violations of the Charter and of the laws of war. Seyss-Inquart's plight was no doubt intensified by his own refusal to denounce Hitler or the Nazi government. Under these circumstances it was apparent that the only possibility of less than a very heavy sentence depended on showing important grounds for mitigation. In my opinion, Steinbauer followed this avenue to a degree, but insufficiently.

To begin with, he devoted the first half of his nearly day-long argument to the years culminating in the Anschluss, in which Seyss-Inquart played an important part but did nothing criminal. Steinbauer then payed no attention to his clients positions 9n Austria after the Anschluss, or in Poland, although in both capacities he had engaged in anti-Semitic statements and actions. Steinbauer failed to make plausible arguments that since Austria had become part of the Reich, the defendants acts there, even if culpable, were not war crimes. Nor did he point out that in Poland, Seyss-Inquart's statements were not shown to have had any criminal consequences. The prime area of decision on Seyss-Inquart's case and fate, in any event, lay in his conduct as Reich Commissioner in Holland throughout the years of the Netherlands' occupation by the Germans.

There was no denying that Seyss-Inquart had violated the laws of war with respect to treatment of the Dutch Jews and deportation of forced labor. Steinbauer, like many of his colleagues, argued strenuously that 'crimes against peace' had no legal basis, that the rules of the Hague Convention were obsolete, and the obedience to orders and military necessity justified everything the defendant had done. But months before Steinbauer's argument it had become apparent that these arguments were not likely to prevail with the Tribunal.

A defendants proven actions for the benefit of public safety and welfare might, however, have positive results. Steinbauer had included a number of such actions in his address, but it had not be assembled and described in such a way as to impress the listener the way Speer's description of his own prevention of Hitler's scorched earth policy had been presented. Steinbauer had testimonial evidence from Dr Hirshfeld, a high Dutch administrative official, from Doenitz, from General Philipp (Commander of the German troops in Holland), and from British and American generals, which confirmed Seyss-Inquart's vital role in preventing the inundation of large areas in Holland by German-planned destruction of dikes and locks. Steinbauer made brief mention of these matters near the end of his address, but neither he nor his client had much skill as a press agent.

From Justice at Nuremberg by Robert E. Conot: The eleven condemned to death were no longer permitted to exercise in the yard. Whenever one emerged from his cell, he was handcuffed to a guard. For a few minutes a day, one at a time, they were marched up and down in the center of the cell block in lock step with a military policeman. When they saw their attorneys in the Palace of Justice, a GI sat with each of them like a Siamese twin joined at the wrist...Seyss-Inquart viewed his execution with the fatalistic objectivity of a person who is, at one and the same time, both the actor and the director of a tragedy. He asked that those of the condemned who wished to be allowed to meet with each other and to take cold showers daily—he said that, as Reich Commissar of the Netherlands, he had permitted these practices, and the men destined for execution had been grateful to him. (Andrus authorized the showers, but prohibited the meetings.)

'You may be convinced, colonel,' Seyss-Inquart wrote, 'that I myself as well as all my fellow sufferers expect calmly the end of an inevitable and, in a certain sense, necessary event, and would certainly do nothing which could render your task more difficult.' The British and French were so apprehensive about demonstrations or a possible attempt to rescue the prisoners that they insisted that no prior announcement of the executions be made.

From Spandau Diary by Albert Speer: A guard goes from cell to cell. He asks whether we want to make use of our right to a daily walk on the ground floor. The yard is still barred to us. I have to get out; the cell is beginning to feel unbearably oppressive. So I ask to go. But I shudder at the prospect of seeing the men on death row (Note: The 11 condemned men are housed in cells on the ground floor; the 7 sentenced to prison time are being kept in an upper tier of cells). The guard holds out the chrome handcuffs. Linked together, we have some difficulty descending the winding staircase. In the silence, every step on the iron stairs sounds like a thunderclap. On the ground floor I see eleven soldiers staring attentively into eleven cells. The men inside are eleven of the surviving leaders of the Third Reich...

Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Hitler's Reich commissioner for the Netherlands, sat to my right in the dock for nine months; an amiable Austrian who had tested out as having the highest IQ of all of us. During the trial I had come to like him, because he did not seek evasions, among other reasons...Seyss-Inquart looks out through the doorway; he smiles at me each time I pass, and each time that smile gives me the chills. I cannot stand it for long. Back in my cell, I decide not to go back down again.

Note: German author Werner Maser, in Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial, comments on the above passage by Speer: These and the comments immediately following are typical of Speer's usual fanciful descriptions. Since he was handcuffed to a guard, he could not have seen what was going on in the cells. His remarks on his fellow-defendants speak for themselves." (Speer II)

From The Devil's Disciples by Anthony Read: They were photographed, wrapped in mattress covers, sealed in coffins then driven off in army trucks with a military escort to a crematorium in Munich, which had been told to expect the bodies of fourteen American soldiers. The coffins were opened for inspection by American, British, French and Soviet officials, before being loaded in the cremation ovens. That same evening, a container holding all the ashes was driven away into the Bavarian countryside, in the rain. It stopped in a quiet lane about an hour later, and the ashes were poured into a muddy ditch. Göring, like the other disciples, had come to the end of the road.